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Unraveling the World-Wide Pollution Haven Effect 
Summary 
This paper contributes to the debate on the existence of pollution haven effects by 
systematically measuring the pollution content of trade (measured by the polluction 
content of imports (PCI)) and decomposing it into three components: a ‘deep’ (i.e. 
unrelated to the environmental debate) component and two components (factor 
endowments and environmental policies) that occupy centerstage in the debate on trade 
and the environment. The decomposition is carried out for 1986-88 for an extensive data 
set covering 10 pollutants, 48 countries and 79 ISIC 4-digit sectors. Illustrative 
decompositions presented for 3 of the 10 pollutants in the data set indicate a significant 
pollution haven effect and highlight the role of factor endowments in each region’s PCI. 
However, because the bulk of trade is intra-regional with a high North-North share, 
these effects are small relative to the ‘deep’ determinants of the worldwide pollution 
content of trade. 
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For the environmentally minded, globalization reﬂected in rising trade shares
in world GDP is worrisome, directly because the activity of trading itself gen-
erates pollution, and indirectly because lower environmental standards gener-
ate a comparative advantage in “dirty” industries for developing countries. In
this context, globalization, which reduces transport costs and/or trade barriers,
would shift investment and production of “dirty”goods to the South. As a re-
sult, globalization would lead to an increase in the pollution content of imports
by the North, in conformity with what has been called the “pollution haven
(PH) hypothesis”, and to a worldwide increase in the production of dirty prod-
ucts. Likewise, the literature has emphasized that a tightening of environmental
standards in the North would lead industries to relocate to the South according
to what is referred to as the “pollution haven (PH) eﬀect”. Overall, it is fair
to say that empirical support for the PH hypothesis is weak, while the PH ef-
fect, which is often taken for granted, has proven elusive too, apart from recent
empirical support for the US.
One often-mentioned culprit is lack of data: only the US has time series on
abatement costs at the industry level, and the only comprehensive data set on
emissions is also for that country and for one year (the 1987 IPPS data elab-
orated by the World Bank). Although the PH eﬀect is obviously a worldwide
issue involving rich and poor countries, faced with this lack of data, researchers
have made progress on the PH debate by carrying out what we would call “par-
tial” studies. First, the eﬀects contributing to the location of economic activity
(see the illustrative example in section 2) have been analyzed in the context of
ﬁrm case studies (e.g. Eskeland and Harrison (2002)). Second, progress has also
been made by case studies of a particular pollutant (e.g. Antweiler et al. (2001)
for SO2 emissions). Third, many studies have been carried out on the US where
recent evidence controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and the endogeneity
of environmental policy has detected a signiﬁcant PH eﬀect (Ederington et al
(2004, 2005) and Levinson and Taylor (2005) using a panel data set of US indus-
tries). And fourth, when covering more countries, the analysis is often limited
to speciﬁc sectors (e.g. Cole and Elliott (2003)). In the absence of systematic
data on emissions across countries, making progress has been largely limited
to gathering fragmentary evidence (see e.g. Copeland and Taylor (2003) for a
review).
In this paper we go beyond partial evidence and carry out a more systematic
global estimation of the pollution content of trade across all industrial sectors in
which we disentangle the role of factor endowments and environmental policies
from the more fundamental (or “deep”) determinants of bilateral trade. To our
knowledge, such a decomposition exercise, which allows one to get a better han-
dle on the PH eﬀect, has not been carried out previously. As an example of what
transpires from a global decomposition exercise, consider the usual version of the
PH eﬀect, according to which a tightening of Northern environmental standards
will increase the pollution content of imports by the North. But what about
the South? In reality, developing countries are also importing dirty products,
2and they may even be larger importers of those goods if one takes into account
the fact that highly polluting activities are often capital-intensive. In addition,
the pollution content of global trade depends on composition eﬀects since trade
involves not only North-South trade, but also North-North and South-South
trade. The decompostion framework proposed in this paper weighs the impor-
tance of the PH eﬀect relative to other contributing factors.
Section 2 discusses brieﬂy the pollution haven hypothesis and the pollution
haven eﬀect, arguing that it can be usefully captured by the pollution content of
trade (in our case, the pollution content of imports), and specifying how it can
be measured. Section 3 estimates a model of bilateral trade in emissions (one
for each pollutant) in which factor endowments, environmental policies, and
‘deep’ determinants (i.e. all remaining determinants) are separately identiﬁed.
These estimates then serve to identify the relative importance of the pollution
haven eﬀect with respect to the factor endowment eﬀect in the worldwide pol-
lution content of trade. Because of data limitations on emissions over time,
computations are carried out in cross-section so that the paper’s estimates must
be considered with caution, it being hoped that the approach developed here
will yield more conclusive results when better emission data becomes available.
Section 4 concludes.
2 The Pollution Content of Trade: A Framework
We show ﬁrst how the pollution content of trade can be used to study the
pollution haven and the factor endowment eﬀects. We then introduce the total
and average measures to be analyzed subsequently.
2.1 The Pollution Haven Eﬀect
To ﬁx the terms of the debate about the PH eﬀect, and to motivate the choice
of the pollution content of imports (PCI)1, consider the following simple hypo-
thetical example in a Heckscher-Ohlin framework. Two countries, North (N)
and South (S), produce two goods, a dirty and a clean good, with pollution per
unit of output of the dirty good being identical in N and S. Both countries are
the same in all respects except that N has a higher income per capita than S.
Assume that environmental quality is a normal good. Then N will have stricter
environmental standards and will import the dirty good and hence its trade will
be “embodied” with emissions. Conversely, S will import the clean good from
its partner and so the PCI of S will be zero. Therefore, in this two-commodity
world, the PCI of N from S is positive (PCINS > 0), and the PCI of S from
N is zero (PCISN = 0; in a multi-commodity world, PCINS, PCISN ￿= 0,
1We could have carried out the analysis by measuring the pollution content of exports.
Since the econometric analysis is carried out on bilateral trade, both approaches are in eﬀect
equivalent. Because export data are less reliable, we use imports to minimize mismeasurement.
3PCINS > PCISN). Note that world pollution has increased with respect to the
autarkic equilibrium.
Next, consider two experiments. First, consider globalization via a reduction
in transport costs, or a reduction in trade barriers. This will lead S to specialize
in the production of dirty products. Globalization thus increases PCINS in
conformity with what has been called the PH hypothesis (the previously dirty
production in N is now carried out in S under less-stringent environmental
standards). As a second experiment, consider a tightening of environmental
regulations in N. This is also expected to lead to a relocation of dirty industries
from N to S, increasing PCINS through what is referred to as the PH eﬀect in
the literature.
Bring in now factor endowment diﬀerences, supposing that dirty industries
are capital intensive and that N is relatively well-endowed in capital. If the PH
eﬀect were small (as suggested by recent US-based evidence mentioned above),
then the factor endowment inﬂuence (FE eﬀect for short) on comparative ad-
vantage could well dominate. Let us assume this is the case. Then, S will
be importing the dirty good although it has lower environmental standards, a
conﬁguration refered to as reﬂecting the FE hypothesis according to Copeland
and Taylor (2004). Starting from this new conﬁguration, consider again the
two above experiments. With globalization resulting in a reduction in transport
costs and/or trade liberalization, dirty activities might move to N, resulting
in larger dirty imports of S from N. Conversely, a tightening of environmental
policy in N will have the reverse eﬀect, with dirty activities moving to S and
hence implying a decrease in PCINS. Ultimately this may lead to a reversal in
comparative advantage.
Thus, the relative strength of the PH versus the FE eﬀect is determinant
in shaping the worldwide allocation of the PCI between country groups. It also
plays a crucial role regarding the impact of globalization or environmental policy
changes on the pollution content of trade.
To get a full picture of the factors underlying the evolution of the worldwide
pollution content of trade, scale (N and S have diﬀerent economic weight and
both may grow) and technical (abatement activities are diﬀerent in N and S
and vary across time) eﬀects should also be factored in, as well as diﬀerences in
emission intensities across pollutants. And since the debate on trade and the
environment is usually couched in terms of the contribution of rich and poor
countries, compositional eﬀects across regions should also be taken into account.
Because of limitations on the availability of data on emissions, this paper only
explores the determinants of the PCI at one point in time, thereby abstracting
from temporal eﬀects.
2.2 Measuring the PCI
In practice, since pollution intensities vary across sectors and pollutants, an ap-
propriate measure of the PCI must distinguish between the diﬀerent pollutants
4and take into account sector heterogeneity at a reasonably disaggregated level.2
Denote Mijs the value of bilateral imports of country i from country j, in sector
s, and let emissions per dollar of production in country j, sector s and pollutant
k be given by gk
js. Then, the total (Zk
ij) and average (Gk
ij) PCI of country i from


















s Mijs and µijs is the share of sector s in country i imports from
country j.3 This indicator covers the whole distribution of industrial sectors and
its value is sensitive to diﬀerences in emissions across industries and pollutants.
The only comprehensive data on emissions are the 1987 US emissions coeﬃ-
cients computed for 79 4-digit ISIC industries. Note that, abstracting from the
damage caused by the activity of transporting goods, if all countries had the
same emission coeﬃcients, the location of economic activity would not matter.
However, it is clear that US coeﬃcients cannot be applied to a large sample of
countries that includes developed and developing countries. In order to estimate
country-speciﬁc emissions, we draw on the results in Hettige et al (2000), who
ﬁnd that emissions per employee are roughly constant across countries. Thus
we can adjust the US per employee IPPS coeﬃcients, hk













. This amounts to
assuming that emissions per dollar are inversely proportional to labor produc-
tivity. While this adjustment to US coeﬃcients seems reasonable, we abstain
from extending it to other years since changes in emission intensities over time
are not determined only by labor-productivity changes.4
Changes in the volume of pollution embodied in worldwide trade (i.e. in
PCI) is the simplest, most direct, and perhaps most reliable global indicator of
the PH eﬀect. Here we use average and total PCIs over 79 4-digit ISIC industries
2The traditional approach relies on the less accurate comparison between “clean” and
“dirty” sectors. It is true that, at the 3-digit ISIC level, the group of “dirty” sectors (reported
in table A2 in Appendix 2) does not seem to change much across pollution criteria (e.g. actual
emissions vs. abatement costs, see Mani and Wheeler (1997)). However, the deﬁnition of
“clean” sectors is more ambiguous, and the intermediate sectors that are dropped from the
usual analysis of clean vs. dirty industries often represent a substantial part of the PCI (up to
50% for some pollutants according to our estimates, see table A3 in Appendix 2). Moreover,
at the 4-digit ISIC level, the classiﬁcation of dirty sectors is not robust across pollutants. Two
examples taken from the IPPS coeﬃcients of the World Bank, establish the superiority of our
approach. Take ﬁrst the manufacture of leather products (ISIC 3233) which is one of the
cleanest activities in terms of SO2 released in the air, but also one of the most polluting ones
in terms of metal toxic pollution. Take next sugar factories and reﬁneries (ISIC 3118): it has
the opposite pattern, releasing much SO2 in the air, but negligible toxic pollution. Overall,
more than a quarter of ISIC 4-digit categories exhibit a similar pattern, ranking in the top
ten most polluting sectors according to one pollution criteria and among the ten cleanest
according to another.
3Muradian et al. (2002) and Ederington et al (2004) use a similar indicator.
4In an exploratory setting, using additional time-series data on SO2 emissions in China,
Grether et al. (2006) construct a time-series of emissions for a similar sample of countries.
5for 29 developing and 19 developed countries and 10 pollutants.5 Due to space
constraints, we only report results for a selection of three pollutants6: SO2 in
the air (SO2), widely used in other studies, total toxic pollution (TPTT) and
biological oxygen demand in water (BOWT)7. All three pollutants generate
relatively small transborder externalities beyond those embodied in trade.
3 Unraveling the Pollution Haven Eﬀect
From equation (1) above, it is clear that the PCI in bilateral trade will be given
by emissions per unit of trade times the volume of trade, the latter depending
in turn on environmental policy, factor endowments and other “deep” deter-
minants, i.e. determinants unrelated to endowments or environmental policies.
Omitting pollutant superscript k for simplicity, the PCI of country i￿s imports
from country j, Zij, can be decomposed multiplicatively into a “deep” determi-
nant component, Ωij (i.e. the import- embodied pollution that would occur for
reasons unrelated to environmental policy and endowments), a FE eﬀect, κij,
and a PH eﬀect, ￿ij:
Zij = Ωijκij￿ij (2)
This multiplicative form appears reasonable and easy to handle, particularly
in a gravity-like framework. When we want to abstract from the PH eﬀect, the
FE eﬀect or from both simultaneously, this amounts to assume that ￿ij = 1 or
κij = 1 or ￿ij = κij = 1 respectively.
We proceed in two steps. In a ﬁrst step, we regress for each pollutant k,
the bilateral PCI, Zk
ij, on a set of explanatory variables capturing the eﬀects
identiﬁed in equation (2). Having checked that the estimated coeﬃcients are
plausible and the overall ﬁt satisfactory, in a second step, we use the estimated
coeﬃcients to decompose the total predicted PCI for each pollutant into the
three components, namely “deep”, “FE”, and “PH” eﬀects.
5The split between developed and developing countries was carried out using 11,000$ per
capita as the break point, which corresponds to a trough in the bimodal distribution of incomes
per capita. Other cut-oﬀ values are considered in section 3.2.
6Results for the other pollutants are available from the authors upon request. They will
be mentioned in the text when they diﬀer markedly from those for the three selected ones.
7SO2 is mainly emitted by fossil fuel combustion. It may cause respiratory diseases and
damage trees and crops. It is also a prime source of acid rain, which damages forests and
buildings and contributes to the acidiﬁcation of lakes and streams. Toxic pollution is measured
as toxic chemicals in air, land and water (the rank correlation between the total measure
and the media-speciﬁc measure is 0.93 for air, 0.87 for land and 0.46 for water). It causes
damage to internal organs, neurological functions and can result in decreased hutching success,
reproductive problems and cancers. Biological oxygen demand in water measures how much
oxygen is being used by aerobic microorganisms to decompose organic matter (e.g. dead
plants, leaves, manure, sewage, food waste). If these bacteria are using too much of disolved
oxygen, then there will not be left enough for other organisms.
63.1 Determinants of the PCI
We want now to isolate the eﬀects of environmental policies and factor endow-
ments on the PCI. The PH eﬀect is captured by diﬀerences in the lead content
of gasoline which is our proxy for environmental policy.8 The capital-labor ra-
tio serves as proxy for endowment diﬀerences, i.e. for the FE eﬀect. Table
1 summarizes the sample characteristics of these variables for each group of
countries along with the average PCI values for each group of countries. The
ﬁgures conﬁrm intuition. The average lead content is higher in the South and
hence low income countries have lower environmental stringency. Likewise, the
capital-labor ratio is on average higher in the North. Finally, PCIN > PCIS
for each one of the three pollutants.
Table 1 here: Summary Statistics by Income Group
The empirical speciﬁcation is given by equation (3) below. It is inspired
by the gravity framework, previously used in cross-country studies of trade in
pollution-intensive activities.9 To avoid erroneously attributing variations in
bilateral PCIs to the two eﬀects of interest, it is important to have as complete
as possible a set of control variables in the vector of “deep” determinants. The α
and β coeﬃcients control for “deep” determinants of bilateral trade, the former
relating to gravity-type equations, and the latter including other controls. The
gravity-type controls include log distance (DISTij), the extent of the potential
market (MKTij = ln(GDPi ∗ GDPj)), proxied by the product of GDPs (since
these cannot be entered individually in the presence of ﬁxed eﬀects), common
religion (CRij), common language (CLij) and landlockedness (LLij).
lnZk
ij = α0 + α1DISTij + α2MKTij + α3CRij + α4CLij + α5LLij (3)
+β1iDEi + β2jDMj + β3∆SKij + β4∆HKij + β5∆COALij + β6∆OILij
+γ1∆LEADij + γ2∆KLij + εij
Other controls include importer (DMj) and exporter (DEi) ﬁxed eﬀects.
These dummy variables control for country-speciﬁc omitted determinants. As
further control variables, we include proxies for diﬀerences in natural resource
8This index is one of the few available proxies for environmental stringency for a large
number of countries that covers the 1980s. It is a market-share weighted sum of the maximum
lead content of diﬀerent gasolines (see Grether and Mathys (2003) and appendix 1 for further
details). Hilton and Levinson (1998), Damania et al. (2003), Fredriksson et al (2005) and
Cole et al. (2006) also use this proxy for environmental policy.
9An advantage of the gravity model over the earlier standard factor endowment-based
studies (e.g. Tobey (1990), is that it exploits the large amount of information contained in
bilateral trade ﬂows. It was ﬁrst applied by van Beers and van den Bergh (1997) on a cross
section of OECD countries. This initial approach has been extended in a number of directions,
including the panel dimension (Harris et al (2001)), developing countries (Cagatay and Mihci
(2003) and Grether and de Melo (2004)) the role of product diﬀerentiation (Jug and Mirza
(2005)) or of regional free trade agreements (Kahn and Yoshino (2004)), while the endogeneity
of environmental policy has been examined in Mantovani and Vancauteren (2005).
7endowments across countries, oil production (∆OILij = ln( OILi
OILj)) and coal
production (∆COALij = ln( COALi
COALj)) since it is known that many activities
that generate pollution are linked with the weight-reducing activities associated
with the processing of primary products. We also include two measures of skills
since it has sometimes been claimed that pollution intensive activities are also
skill-intensive (see Cole and Elliott (2005)). The two variables are diﬀerences in
the skill ratio (i.e. (skilled+ base skills)/unskilled labor) (∆SKij = ln( SKi
SKj)),
and diﬀerences in the ratio of high skilled labor (skilled/base skills), (∆HKij =
ln( HKi
HKj)). To sum up, one may expect these control variables to be related to
the bilateral PCI, although their precise inﬂuence is ultimately an empirical
matter.
To these variables we add the PH and FE variables mentioned above, namely
the diﬀerence in the maximum lead content of gasoline (∆LEADij = ln[ LEADi
LEADj]),
and the diﬀerence in capital-labor ratios (∆KLij = ln[ KLi
KLj]).
In equation 3, the ‘deep’ determinants are given in the ﬁrst two lines and
are followed by the measures of interest in the third line. The regression is run
for each one of the three selected pollutants for average values over the 1986-88
period.10 To account for the possibility that LEAD may be endogenous (as sug-
gested by Ederington and Minier (2003) who found evidence that environmental
policy has partly served as a substitute for protection using aggregate data), we
instrument LEAD by the UN’s measure of Human development (the HDI)
which is a priori not correlated with the errors, while its signiﬁcant correlation
with LEAD is -0.47.
Recall that the purpose of the estimates is to carry out subsequent simula-
tions that will decompose the regional PCI into its three components identiﬁed
above. Aside from obvious robustness checks (see below), two objections could
be raised to estimates derived from (3). The ﬁrst relates to the results being
entirely driven by the volume of trade rather than the composition of the lat-
ter. The second relates to the selection of the sample over which (3) should be
estimated.
Regarding the ﬁrst criticism, one may argue that our results are basically
driven by the volume of trade and hence scale eﬀects. We address this potential
shortcoming by regressing the average (Gk
ij) instead of the total PCI (Zk
ij) and
hence focusing only on the composition eﬀect. As the trade volume dimension is
absent, the traditional gravity-type control variables should in principle all dis-
appear. However, we maintain distance as a regressor to control for the fact that
dirty industries are predominantly weight-reducing activities (see e.g. Grether
and de Melo (2004)) and might hence be particularly sensitive to transport
costs. The alternative speciﬁcation then becomes:
10In the regression, we use only trade ﬂows above a threshold value of $ 10’000.
8lnGk
ij = ￿ α0 + ￿ α1DISTij + ￿ β1iDEi + ￿ β2jDMj (4)
+￿ β3∆SKij + ￿ β4∆HKij + ￿ β5∆COALij + ￿ β6∆OILij
+￿ γ1∆LEADij + ￿ γ2∆KLij +￿ εij
As to the sample over which estimation should take place, one might object
that since one is interested in the PH eﬀect, all intra-regional bilateral trade (i.e.
N-N and S-S) should be deleted. Thus, as a robustness check, we also report
estimates of (3) over a sample that excludes intra-regional trade. However as
intra-regional trade should also respond to the same determinants as N-S and
S-N trade and since we are interested in capturing the PH and FE eﬀects at
the worldwide level, we consider that the relevant coeﬃcient estimates for the
decomposition exercise are those derived from the whole sample.
Table 2 reports results for the two speciﬁcations (3 and 4) and the two
samples (world or NS only) for the three pollutants mentioned above (SO2,
BOWT, and TPTT). Overall, results are encouraging. Start with estimates of
equation (3). First, the signs of the variables of interest are as expected in all
speciﬁcations, and signiﬁcant most of the time. The same comment applies to
the gravity-related controls. As to the other controls for which we have no a
priori expectations, they are only signiﬁcant in some speciﬁcations. Second, the
results are quite similar across all 10 pollutants.11
Table 2 here: Pollution Content of Imports Regressions
As to the comparison between OLS and 2SLS estimates for equation (3),
coeﬃcients do not change sign and except for BOWT are very similar in terms
of signiﬁcativity for all variables apart from LEAD, which becomes signiﬁcant
through the instrumentation. In the absence of more suitable instruments and
the likelihood of endogeneity, we rely on the 2SLS estimates. As to the robust-
ness of our speciﬁcation, reassuringly, when we abstract from volume eﬀects,
and hence focus on detecting PH and FE eﬀects in the composition of bilateral
trade (equation (4)), we still ﬁnd the same signs for both variables of inter-
est. Finally, estimates are suﬃciently close when the sample is restricted to
North-South bilateral trade ﬂows indicating that the results of decompositions
reported below would not be sensitive to the choice of sample. However in two
out of three cases the contribution of the FE eﬀect would be larger if we were
to carry out decompositions based on this restricted sample.
Overall, we retain from the estimates in table 2 that the data support the
presence of PH and FE eﬀects. The average values of endowments and policies
reported in table 1 allow one to deduce the sign of these eﬀects on PCINS
and PCISN. Thus, starting from the “deep” determinants of bilateral trade,
the PCINS will be reduced through the ‘FE’ eﬀect because the North has a
comparative advantage in dirty products. Likewise, because of more stringent
11With the exception of total metal pollution where the PH and FE eﬀects are reversed.
9environmental standards, the PCINS will be increased through the ‘PH’ eﬀect.
The opposite patterns will hold for PCISN. However, to go further, we need to
take into account the fact that there is horizontal trade which will be reﬂected in
PCINN and PCISS values with the worldwide eﬀect being a weighted average
of vertical and horizontal trade ﬂows. We now carry out a decomposition of the
PCI into its constituents parts.
3.2 Decomposing the PCI into the PH and the FE eﬀects
Let TOT stand for the total percentage increase of the PCI of a given region
when, starting from deep determinants, and successively introducing the FE and
the PH eﬀects, with the corresponding percentage increases of the PCI denoted
by FE and PH respectively. Then for each pollutant k:
1 + TOT = (1 + FE)(1 + PH) (5)
The decomposition results are reported in Table 3 for all combinations of
import ﬂows and for each pollutant. The table reports (in lines) vertical ﬂows
(NS+SN), then horizontal ﬂows (NN+SS), with the total (‘world’) eﬀect coming
last. Along a given column, whathever the eﬀect (FE, PH or TOT), the
aggregate result (i.e. vertical, horizontal or world PCI) is equal to the weighted
average of two components (i.e. NS/SN, NN/SS or vertical/horizontal) using as
weights the share of the component in the relevant PCI ( i.e.Ω for the FE and
TOT eﬀects, Ωκ for the PH eﬀect).
Consider for example the worldwide decomposition for biological oxygen
demand in water reported in the row identiﬁed by “World” as import ﬂow.
Starting from the base pollution content of trade, adding diﬀerences in factor
endowments reduces the PCI by 4%. Adding diﬀerences in environmental reg-
ulations increases the PCI by 11%. Taken together, the two eﬀects increase the
world PCI by 7%.
Then, if we focus on the PH eﬀect, the worldwide result of 11% is in fact
a weighted average between the PH eﬀect on horizontal ﬂows (13%) and the
PH eﬀect on vertical ﬂows (1%), with corresponding weights of 88% and 12%.
The aggregate PH eﬀect on vertical ﬂows can itself be decomposed into its
Northern (173%) and its Southern (-70%) component, with import shares being
respectively 29% and 71%.
Table 3 here: Decomposition of the PCI into the PH and the FE Eﬀects
Analyzing results in table 3, ﬁve patterns stand out. First, as emphasized
by those involved in the PH debate, for imports of the North (from the South)
whatever the pollutant, the PH eﬀect leads to a strong increase in the PCI while
the FE eﬀect has also a strong impact, but in the opposite direction. Second, a
reverse pattern of similar magnitude takes place in the PCI of the South (from
the North). Third, these countervailing forces naturally tend to compensate
10each other, so that the FE and PH eﬀects on overall vertical trade are several
orders of magnitude smaller than on isolated (either Northern or Southern) PCI
ﬂows. As could be expected, the net impact is driven by the Northern pattern,
but the mitigating impact of the Southern PCI (at least more than a quarter
of vertical PCI) should not be underestimated. Fourth, similar composition
eﬀects tend to reduce the estimated impact of the FE and the PH eﬀect on
the world PCI because environmental policy and endowment diﬀerences are
considerably smaller for horizontal trade, which accounts for more than 75% of
world PCI. Fifth, for two out of three pollutants, the PH eﬀect dominates the
FE eﬀect whatever the type of imports considered, while for the third pollutant
(biological oxygen demand), the PH eﬀect is only dominated in the case of
Northern imports from the South.
Although these results should be viewed as illustrative, they also give an
estimate of the extent of reduction in the worldwide pollution of trade that
would occur if there were a complete harmonization of environmental policies.
The harmonization eﬀect can be approximately read oﬀ the relevant PH columns
in table 3 by changing the sign.12 Taking all 10 pollutants, harmonization would
reduce the total PCI by 3%.
As a sensitivity test to the results in table 3, we computed conﬁdence inter-
vals for the predicted values of the diﬀerent PCI levels. Results are reported
in table A4 (available upon request). The sign of the individual eﬀects do not
change most of the time, but there are several changes in the total eﬀects. Ag-
gregate worldwide eﬀects remain small, and one can conclude that we obtain
the same orders of magnitude.
As composition eﬀects across regions happen to matter, another natural
robustness check is to change the GDP per capita threshold above which a
country is considered to be a developed economy (US$ 11’000 in the original
calculations). Two alternative thresholds have been considered, in order to add
or take away ﬁve countries to the original group of 19 Northern countries (vs.
29 Southern countries). As can be seen in table A5 (available upon request),
the overall patterns are quite insensitive to this change of deﬁnition.
4 Conclusions
This paper contributes to the debate on trade and the environment by extending
the usual case studies (one country or a few products) to a systematic analyis
of the content of individual pollutants in global trade at the most disaggregated
level for which there is available emission data. While the results share the
limitations of other studies due to the absence of more systematic emission data,
the paper goes beyond the contributions to the debate that focus on a handful
of ‘dirty’ industries or a case study of a speciﬁc pollutant. In our unraveling of
the PH eﬀect, we have controlled for the transport cost component of the PCI
12The exact variation would be given by −
(x/100)
1+(x/100) where x is the percentage change
reported in table (3).
11as well as other ‘deep’ determinants of the bilateral pollution content of trade,
thereby allowing us to isolate the role of diﬀerences in factor endowments and
environmental policies.
We do ﬁnd evidence of traditional PH and FE eﬀects that have often been
elusive in the literature. Thus the PCI of the North is lowered because on aver-
age its endowments are favorable to activities with high emissions and likewise
its PCI is higher because of the probable delocalization of dirty industries to
the South associated with stricter environment policies in the North. Symmet-
rically, we measure the contribution (in the opposite direction) of the PH and
FE on the South’s PCI. However, because unlike other studies, by carrying out
our analysis on global trade which includes the dominant share of North-North
trade, we are able to place the PH and PE eﬀects in a proper context. For
each one of the 10 pollutants we ﬁnd that these eﬀects contribute to less than
10% of the overall determinants of emissions. At least for the 1986-88 period, it
would appear that diﬀerences in factor endowments and environmental policies
have only marginally aﬀected the pollution content of world trade although the
impact has been stronger on vertical (North-South) trade ﬂows.
In the absence of time-series data, we cannot check if these patterns are
stable over time so that more conclusive evidence on the PH debate will have to
wait until the availability of comparable data over time on environmental policy,
abatement cost or emissions, and on disaggregated trade policy measures at the
sector level across a large sample of countries in which developing countries
are systematically covered. Much like in an earlier debate around the Leontief
paradox regarding the factor content of US trade, better data will be required
to get a ﬁrmer grasp of the quantitative importance of the eﬀects involved.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
       
Variable (units)  Statistics  North**             
(19 countries) 
South**           
(29 countries) 
Lead Content        
(Grams / Gallon)  Mean  0.24  0.58 
  Min  0.0002  0.16 
  Max  0.74  0.96 
  C.V.  0.76  0.43 
Capital/Labor        
(1987 Thousand US Dollars)  Mean  88.94  9.67 
  Min  27.03  0.97 
  Max  159.02  35.76 
  C.V.  0.38  0.89 
Imports*        
(Million Current US Dollars)  Mean  930  99 
  Min  101  5 
  Max  5'546  510 
  C.V.  1.34  1.30 
PCI-BOWT*        
(Million Pounds)  Mean  1.19  0.17 
  Min  0.11  0.01 
  Max  5.97  0.59 
  C.V.  1.29  1.00 
PCI-SO2*        
(Million Pounds)  Mean  7.24  1.27 
  Min  0.71  0.07 
  Max  38.10  7.70 
  C.V.  1.31  1.32 
PCI-TPTT*        
(Million Pounds)  Mean  5.39  0.86 
  Min  0.56  0.05 
  Max  24.70  3.57 
  C.V.  1.18  1.11 
       
Notes:        
C.V: Coefficient of variation.  
* Bilateral data has been averaged by importer. 
** For income group definition see table A1 in the appendix.   2 
 
  Table 2: Pollution Content of Imports Regressions, 1986/1988  
                         
  Biochemical Oxygen Demand  Water (BOWT)  SO2 in the Air (SO2)  Total Toxic Pollution Intensity (TPTT) 
       Total PCI  Av. PCI  NS PCI       Total PCI  Av. PCI  NS PCI       Total PCI  Av. PCI  NS PCI 
   OLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS  OLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS  OLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS 
∆Lead  -0.16***  -0.32***  -0.39***  -0.39***  -0.02  -0.21***  -0.19***  -0.20***  -0.01  -0.21***  -0.20***  -0.21*** 
  [5.31]  [5.22]  [10.28]  [5.37]  [0.60]  [3.86]  [6.53]  [3.05]  [0.52]  [4.26]  [7.71]  [3.36] 
∆ Capital/Labor  -0.11  -0.29***  -0.42***  -0.2  -0.18**  -0.16**  -0.36***  -0.44***  -0.19**  -0.12*  -0.41***  -0.32*** 
  [1.22]  [3.29]  [6.22]  [1.54]  [2.44]  [2.05]  [7.01]  [3.76]  [2.18]  [1.77]  [9.04]  [2.95] 
∆ Skill Ratio
a)  0.09  0.33**  -0.23*  -0.05  0.50***  0.47***  -0.14  0.18  0.38***  0.30**  -0.50***  -0.04 
  [0.81]  [1.97]  [1.93]  [0.33]  [5.24]  [3.14]  [1.48]  [1.29]  [4.22]  [2.20]  [6.18]  [0.33] 
∆ High Skill Ratio
b)  -0.18  -1.89***  0.17  -1.20***  -0.62***  -2.08***  0.21  -0.97***  -0.43*  -1.78***  0.92***  -0.55** 
  [0.75]  [7.64]  [0.91]  [4.59]  [3.17]  [9.44]  [1.46]  [4.08]  [1.91]  [9.01]  [7.30]  [2.45] 
∆Coal  -0.02  0.01  -0.10***  0.14***  0.03**  0.04**  -0.09***  0.18***  0  0.01  -0.16***  0.14*** 
  [0.79]  [0.43]  [5.88]  [3.80]  [2.03]  [2.19]  [6.52]  [5.38]  [0.02]  [0.36]  [13.50]  [4.51] 
∆Oil  0.03  0  0.01  0.28***  0.05***  0.02  0.02  0.27***  0.04*  0  -0.01  0.22*** 
  [1.04]  [0.07]  [0.74]  [5.82]  [2.93]  [0.66]  [1.21]  [6.09]  [1.98  [0.18]  [0.51]  [5.12] 
Distance  -1.34***  -1.34***  -0.24***  -1.55***  -1.32***  -1.32***  -0.20***  -1.51***  -1.25***  -1.25***  -0.11***  -1.39*** 
  [15.35]  [21.23]  [5.91]  [13.12]  [15.96]  [23.58]  [6.39]  [14.05]  [15.87]  [24.95]  [3.92]  [13.59] 
GDPi*GDPj  0.94***  0.55***    0.61***  0.96***  0.59***    0.63***  0.93***  0.57***    0.61*** 
  [22.00]  [43.30]    [28.91]  [24.74]  [51.77]    [32.56]  [22.33]  [56.43]    [33.73] 
Common Language  1.14***  1.14***    0.50***  1.00***  1.00***    0.70***  0.92***  0.92***    0.49*** 
  [7.52]  [8.24]    [2.93]  [6.74]  [8.15]    [4.53]  [6.79]  [8.34]    [3.37] 
Common Religion  0.72***  0.72***    0.34  0.74***  0.74***    0.37*  0.67***  0.67***    0.35* 
  [5.18]  [4.52]    [1.63]  [5.34]  [5.25]    [1.94]  [6.42]  [5.29]    [1.92] 
Landlocked  -0.67**  -2.08***    -0.44  -0.46*  -1.57***    0.11  -0.54**  -1.54***    -0.43 
  [2.49]  [7.67]    [1.33]  [1.99]  [6.52]    [0.35]  [2.11]  [7.13]    [1.50] 
Observations  2107  2107  2107  1109  2107  2107  2107  1109  2107  2107  2107  1109 
R-squared  0.73  0.73  0.34  0.78  0.74  0.74  0.47  0.8  0.78  0.78  0.49  0.81 
                         
Notes:                       
Dependent variable (in log): Total PCI: Total bilateral PCI, Av. PCI: Average bilateral PCI, NS PCI: Total bilateral PCI between North and South. 
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets, in 2SLS regressions lead is instrumented with the human development index, first stage F statistics are 48.50 for the average PCI 
regressions and 56.43 for the others, fixed effects are not reported. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, 
a) (skilled+base skills) / unskilled, 




























Table 3: Decomposition of the PCI into the FE and the PH-Effect (%) 
                     
    Biochemical Oxygen Demand 






observations  FE-Effect  PH-Effect  TOT-Effect  FE-Effect  PH-Effect  TOT-Effect  FE-Effect  PH-Effect  TOT-Effect 
NS  544  -86  173  -14  -44  114  20  -38  106  27 
SN  565  127  -70  -33  61  -65  -44  42  -64  -49 
NS+SN  1109  -19  1  -19  -13  15  1  -8  8  -1 
NN  342  -1  13  12  -1  9  9  0  -3  -3 
SS  656  -22  -16  -34  -1  -6  -7  -5  -9  -13 
NN+SS  998  -2  13  11  -1  9  8  0  -3  -4 
World  2107  -4  11  7  -3  10  6  -2  -1  -3 
                     
 
  Ω  Ω k k k k  Ω k k k kℓ  Ω  Ω k k k k  Ω k k k kℓ  Ω  Ω k k k k  Ω k k k kℓ 
Share of NS in NS+SN  75  29  79  70  45  83  63  42  81 
Share of NN in NN+SS  97  98  98  95  96  96  95  95  95 
Share of NS+SN in World  14  12  11  22  20  21  24  22  24 
                     
Notes:                     
a) NS: North imports from the South, SN: South imports from the North, NN: North imports from the North, SS: South imports from the South. 
Along lines: TOT = (1+FE)*(1+PH) -1, Along columns: AGGv = θ*CMP1+(1-θ)*CMP2  where  AGGv is the aggregate effect (v = NS+SN, NN+SS, World) 
CMP1 and  CMP2 are the two corresponding components and θ is the share of  CMP1 in the relevant PCI (Ω  for the FE and the TOT effects, Ω k k k k  for the 
PH effect , Ω k k k kℓ   is only reported for the sake of completeness).   4 
Appendices 
(not submitted for publication) 
 
A1: Data Description 
 
        Bilateral trade flows are taken from the "Trade and Production 
Database" by Olarreaga and Nicita (2001). Imports (imports are known to be 
more reliable than exports) for 48 developing and developed countries are 
available at the 4-digit ISIC level (see appendix A1 for a country-list).  
 
 In order to transform these real bilateral trade flows into the pollution 
content of imports we need some measure of pollution intensity by sector. For 
this purpose we use the World Bank's "Industrial Pollution Pojection System" 
(IPPS), see Hettige et al. (1995) for a detailed description. These IPPS 
coefficients allow us to estimate the amout of pollution (in pounds or 
kilograms) emitted per employee by 4-digit ISIC. In total 10 different 
pollutants (see table A3 in Appendix 2 for a detailed list of these 
pollutants) are proposed. Concerning the exact measure, we use the lower 
bound estimation of pollution per employee. Note that these IPP coefficients 
are strictly speaking only available for 1987 for the US industries. Hettige, 
Mani and Wheeler (2000) show that pollution/labor ratios seem to be roughly 
constant across countries. Hence using employment/output ratios by 3-digit 
industry (4-digit data are not available) and country from the "Trade and 
Production Database " allows us to compute a pollution per dollar of import 
coefficient specific to each country.   
 
    The distance and the common language variable are taken from the cepii 
database, the common religion variable has been constructed on the basis of 
the CIA's World factbook and the GDP values are extracted from the World 
Development Indicators 2004 (WB). Capital and labor endowment data are 
extracted from Sandeep Mahajan (PRMEP), World Bank 2001. The skill ratios and 
coal and oil production have been used from the paper by Gourdon, Maystre and 
de Melo (2006). The human development index for 1987 has been extracted from 
the UN website. 
 
    The database for the maximum lead content in gasoline has been elaborated 
by Grether and Mathys (2002) on the basis of Octel's Worldwide Gasoline 
Survey. More precisely the average has been worked out by using different 
types of gasoline and weighting them by their market share. Therefore, the 
proxy constructed takes into account the importance of the different types of 
gasoline in the overall market. If one admits that it is generally more 
costly to produce gasoline with low lead contents, the selected variable 
represents not only the maximum lead content observed, but also, and this is 
the important feature, in some sense the enforced legal limit of lead content 
in gasoline. Since it is impossible for the moment to obtain an index of 
environmental stringency for the 80s for a large set of countries, the 
average maximum lead content represents at least one of the most important 
environmental indicator. Note also that Damania et al (2003) showed that this 
indicator is closely correlated with other proxies for environmental 
stringency. 
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Table A1: Countries in the sample 
Argentina    Jordan 
Australia*    Japan* 
Austria*    Kenya 
Bolivia    Korea, Rep. 
Canada*    Sri Lanka 
Chile    Mexico 
China    Malawi 
Cameroon    Malaysia 
Colombia    Netherlands* 
Costa Rica    Norway* 
Denmark*    New Zealand* 
Ecuador    Pakistan 
Egypt, Arab Rep.    Panama 
Spain*    Peru 
Finland*    Philippines 
France*    Portugal* 
United Kingdom*    Singapore* 
Greece*    Sweden* 
Guatemala    Thailand 
Honduras    Trinidad and Tobago 
Indonesia    Turkey 
India    Uruguay 
Ireland*    United States* 
Italy*    Venezuela, RB 
     
Note: (*) stands for developed economies, 
e.i. economies where the average GDP 
per capita over the sample period in 1995 














   6 
 
 
Table A2: Dirty and Clean Sectors 
Dirty  Clean 
ISIC 3-digit    Description  ISIC 3-digit    Description 
341     Paper and products  321     Textiles 
351     Industrial chemicals  382*     Machinery except electrical 
369     Other non-metallic 
mineral products 
383*     Machinery electrical 
371     Iron and steel  384     Transport equipment 
372     Non-ferrous metals  385     Professional and scientific 
equipment 
Note: * These sectors have been classified as overall clean. When only looking at pollution intensity in 
heavy metals however they are on ranks 8 and 9 respectively.                                                                                








Table A3: Pollutants 





TPTT    Toxic pollution intensity - TOTAL  73 
MPTT    Toxic metal pollution intensity - TOTAL  85 
S2AI    SO2 - AIR  65 
N2AI    NO2 - AIR  61 
COAI    CO - AIR  59 
VOAI    Volatile organic compounds - AIR  59 
FPAI    Fine particulates - AIR  64 
TSAI    Total suspended particulates - AIR  48 
BOWT    Biochemical oxygen demand - WATER  79 
TSWT    Total suspended solids - WATER  91 
        

















Table A4: Confidence Intervals for the decomposition estimates (%) 
                                       
    Biochemical Oxygen Demand Water 





Observations  FE-Effect  PH-Effect  TOT Effect  FE-Effect  PH-Effect  TOT Effect  FE-Effect  PH-Effect  TOT Effect 
NS  544  -75  ;  -60  167 ;  180  -34  ;  12  -53  ;  -34  107 ;  122  -3  ;  47  -48  ;  -27  101 ;   111  4  ;  55 
SN  565  118 ;  138  -77  ;  -63  -50  ;  -11  56  ;  66  -73  ;  -55  -58  ;  -26  38  ;  47  -72  ;  -56  -61  ;  -35 
NS+SN  1109  -26  ;  -11  -17  ;  20  -38  ;  6  -18  ;  -5  -3  ;  33  -20  ;  26  -15  ;  -1  -8  ;  23  -21  ;  23 
NN  342  -1  ;  -1  9  ;  17  8  ;  16  -1  ;  0  5  ;  13  4  ;  13  0  ;  0  -7  ;  0  -7  ;  1 
SS  656  -26  ;  -18  -16  ;  -15  -38  ;  -31  -4  ;  1  -6  ;  -5  -10  ;  -4  -7  ;  -3  -9  ;  -8  -16  ;  -11 
NN+SS  998  -2  ;  -1  9  ;  16  7  ;  15  -1  ;  0  5  ;  12  4  ;  12  0  ;  0  -7  ;  0  -7  ;  0 
World  2107  -6  ;  -2  5  ;  17  -1  ;  14  -5  ;  -1  3  ;  16  -2  ;  15  -4  ;  0  -7  ;  5  -11  ;  5 
                                       
Notes:                                       
95% Confidence intervals on the predicted values are reported. 
















Table A5: Decomposition of the PCI into the FE and the PH-Effect (in %) with Changing Income Group Definition 
                       
      Biochemical Oxygen Demand 










Observations  FE-Effect  PH-Effect  TOT Effect  FE-Effect  PH-Effect  TOT Effect  FE-Effect  PH-Effect  TOT Effect 
Initial  544  -86  173  -14  -44  114  20  -38  106  27 
Higher  473  -54  111  -3  -40  112  27  -33  97  31  NS 
Lower  549  -69  166  -20  -46  16  11  -40  99  19 
Initial  565  127  -70  -33  61  -65  -44  42  -64  -49 
Higher  489  78  -60  -28  46  -58  -38  32  -56  -42  SN 
Lower  575  164  -63  -3  76  -52  -16  52  -53  -29 
Initial  1109  -19  1  -19  -13  15  1  -8  8  -1 
Higher  962  -8  -3  -12  -8  12  3  -5  4  -1  NS+SN 
Lower  1124  -31  20  -17  -19  30  5  -15  25  6 
Initial  342  -1  13  12  -1  9  9  0  -3  -3 
Higher  182  -1  16  14  -1  11  10  0  -3  -3  NN 
Lower  550  0  11  11  1  7  8  1  -6  -4 
Initial  656  -22  -16  -34  -1  -6  -7  -5  -9  -13 
Higher  963  -33  -12  -41  -12  -3  -15  -11  -7  -17  SS 
Lower  433  -29  -21  -45  -10  -11  -19  -11  -14  -23 
Initial  998  -2  13  11  -1  9  8  0  -3  -4 
Higher  1145  -3  15  11  -2  9  8  -1  -3  -4  NN+SS 
Lower  983  0  11  10  -0  6  7  1  -6  -5 
                       
Notes:                       
a) See notes table3. 
b) Higher: Treshold at US $ 15'000; Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Singapore and Spain become Southern countries. 
c) Lower: Treshold at US $ 6'500; Argentina, Korea, Mexico, Trinidad Tobago and Uruguay become Northern countries. 
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Table A6: Variable Description 
     
Variable  Description  Source 
h  Pollution per employee  IPPS, World Bank 
L/X  Inverse labor productivity  Trade and Production Database, 1976-2000 
M  Bilateral import flows  Trade and Production Database, 1976-2000 
DIST  Geodesic Distance between the most important cities  http://www.cepii.fr 
MKT  Product of GDPs  World Bank Development Indicator 2004 
CR  Common Religion  Correlation Coefficient, based on CIA's World Factsbook 
CL  Dummy for common language  http://www.cepii.fr 
LL  Dummy for landlockedness  http://www.cepii.fr 
SK 
Proportion of population over 15 years with completed 
primary education with respect to population with less 
than 4 years of schooling in 1987. 
Barro and Lee (2000) 
HK 
Proportion of population over 15 years with completed 
high education with respect to population with less 
than 4 years of schooling in 1987. 
Barro and Lee (2000) 
COAL  Production of coal  World Energy Council (2004) 
OIL  Production of oil  World Energy Council (2004) 
LEAD  Average maximum lead content in gasoline  Octels world wide gasoline survey, prepaired base available on 
http://www2.unine.ch/Jahia/site/irene/op/edit/pid/12149?matrix=101 
K/L  Capital to labor ratio  Sandeep Mahajan (PRMEP), World Bank 2001 
HDI  Human development indicator for 1987  United Nations Database NOTE DI LAVORO DELLA FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI 
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